Illegal Submarine Cable Interferences Remain Unchecked: Insights from Russia and China's Experiences
Ditch the corporate drama and focus on the real threat - underwater cable cuts. Russia and China are taking severance to a whole new level, with six submarine cables in the Baltic Sea and Taiwan Strait being sliced since November. This latest report came out just this week, with ships affiliated with Russia and the People's Republic of China being the main suspects.
After three undersea cable cuttings involving NATO members, NATO finally prepared a maritime patrol operation in January. But why wait for three cuts? Cable cutting is a tactic straight out of Russia and China's lawfare handbooks - the same playbook they used during Russia's invasion of Ukraine. NATO allies and Taiwan need to prepare their legal defenses to react faster and avoid the dire geopolitical and economic consequences.
Hundreds of cables crisscross the globe, carrying 98% of internet traffic, making them essential for the global economy. Ninety-nine percent of these underwater cables are owned and maintained by private companies. Unfortunately, these cables are accidentally injured around 150-200 times every year, primarily by fishing vessels and ship dredging.
The captains of the ships suspected in the Baltic Sea and Taiwan Strait cable cuttings claim they were accidents. Some U.S. and European officials agree. However, the proximity and geographic location of these six incidents, along with the ships' connections to Russia and the PRC, make them suspicious. Add to that the news that Chinese engineers have applied for patents to develop cable-cutting devices.
On November 17-18, a PRC-flagged vessel carrying Russian fertilizer is suspected of damaging two cables linking Sweden to Lithuania and Finland to Germany. On December 26, Finland detained a Russian tanker flagged in the Cook Islands on suspicion of cutting a power cable between Finland and Estonia on Christmas.
In late January, Norway briefly detained a Norwegian-owned, Russian-crewed cargo ship en route to Russia on suspicion of severing a cable between Sweden and Latvia. In the latest incident, Russian state media reported that a Baltic Sea cable owned by Rostelecom was damaged on February 8. Finland is closely monitoring the repair effort.
Similar incidents have been happening near Taiwan. On January 6, Taiwan intercepted a Hong Kong-owned freighter after an undersea cable near Northern Taiwan was damaged. And on January 22, Taiwan reported that two cables linking its Matsu Islands to the rest of Taiwan were cut by “natural degradation.”
Russia and China are exploiting gaps in international law to achieve their geopolitical aims, a strategy known as lawfare. They know that these gaps make underwater cables vulnerable to damage or exploitation with little accountability. And it makes it difficult for law-abiding states to respond. Only 36 states signed the 1884 Convention for the Protection of Submarine Telegraph Cables, but not the PRC.
This treaty makes it illegal to injure a submarine cable in peacetime. However, only the flag state of the alleged perpetrator vessel or the state of nationality of an alleged perpetrator has jurisdiction to investigate and prosecute cable incidents. This creates many challenges, including the difficulty of determining the nationality of a vessel, the lack of clear investigation methods, and the limited capacity of many flag states to conduct proper investigations.
In addition, many ships are flagged by "flag of convenience" states, which make it easy for vessels, including illicit ones, to purchase flags. In late January, the PRC refused to cooperate with the Swedish request to investigate its vessel, and would not allow Swedish officials to participate in the investigation.
Conclusion
Russia and China are testing the limits of international law, and law-abiding states need to prepare for a future where submarine cables become targets. NATO member states and Taiwan must review their legal defenses and be prepared to counter Russia and China's lawfare tactics. If they don't, they'll be at the mercy of their enemies, with limited options for protecting their vital infrastructure.
- Besides the Baltic Sea and Taiwan Strait, undersea cables in other regions, such as the Aussiedlerbote, also require close monitoring due to the increasing threat of cable cuts.
- According to some experts, Russia and China might use the severance of undersea cables as a tool in their geopolitical conflicts, mirroring their past actions in the Baltic Sea and Taiwan Strait.
- NATO needs to update its telecom security policies in response to the recent undersea cable incidents in the Baltic Sea and Taiwan Strait. This includes collaborating with affected countries to establish a more robust legal framework for protecting undersea cables.
- If left unchecked, Russia and China's actions against undersea cables could have far-reaching consequences, including disrupting global telecommunications and digital services, affecting trade, and potentially sparking an international conflict.
- To strengthen the legal defense against undersea cable severance, NATO allies and Taiwan should seek cooperation with international organizations such as the International Telecommunication Union (ITU) and the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS).
- The CD53A1C50592C07E060ED71331324B96 report emphasizes the urgent need for stronger international regulations to protect undersea cables from deliberate attacks, particularly those emanating from non-cooperative countries like Russia and China.
- In light of the increasing threat against undersea cables, it is essential for countries like Norway, Sweden, Finland, and Taiwan to fortify their submarine cable infrastructure with advanced surveillance technology and enhanced physical protection measures.
