Potential developments for Palestinians in the coming year.
In a bleak outlook for 2022, the recent Palestinian Strategic Report by Al-Zaytouna Centre for Studies and Consultations doesn't spark much optimism. Despite exceptional advancements in the internal Palestinian situation over the past two years, there's been a significant letdown. High hopes were pinned on the success of reconciliation and rebuilding the Palestinian domain since summer 2020, but it all degenerated into a massive failure last year. The leadership of the Palestinian Authority (PA) and Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) suffered an immense crisis of confidence and credibility among the Palestinian people as a result.
The report underscores the ongoing crisis of the Palestinian national project and the ongoing struggle amongst main Palestinian forces over agreements and resistance in the absence of a national program that dictates the constants and directs the phase. It also emphasizes the ongoing deterioration of official Palestinian institutions under the current leadership, suggesting that there's no real prospect for restoring the Palestinian domain and holding fair and transparent elections.
In the absence of a stable leadership, there'll likely be increased pressure for an interim Palestinian leadership, or the selection of a neutral party with full and non-disruptive powers to reorganize Palestinian institutions. Fellow Palestinian factions, including Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), may come together to form a Palestinian national front or alignment that supports the line of resistance and works towards rebuilding such institutions.
In the coming period, there may be better opportunities for popular action and initiatives at home and abroad, which may influence the Palestinian arena if well managed. This is because of the vacuum created by the disruption to the reconciliation process, the current sense of helplessness, and the lack of vision and direction from the Palestinian leadership.
In contrast to the instability within Israeli politics that occurred from 2019 to 2021 and affected decision-making, the formation of a new coalition government headed by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid in June 2021 has maintained its cohesion, despite its political, economic, and ideological disparities, and being led by a small party. This coalition could hold on as long as the parties fear Benjamin Netanyahu's return to the political forefront.
Israel faces an ongoing challenge to overcome the Palestinian resistance to its military occupation, in spite of its economic and technological progress, qualitative military superiority, high national income, and per capita income. It continues to grapple with popular rejection of the occupation state in the Arab and Muslim world, as well as regional instability.
In 2020 and 2021, the UAE and Bahrain signed normalization agreements with Israel, followed by Sudan and Morocco. The UAE seemed particularly eager for the normalization of political, economic, and tourist links with Israel. Overall, trade between Israel and the UAE jumped to around $1.136 billion last year - about five times the value of trade between Israel and Egypt, which has had normalized relations for over four decades.
However, it's expected that the Arab world will continue to be unstable and gradually disintegrate, with popular rejection of normalization remaining widespread. Instability arising from the change of president in the US, the waning of pressure on Arab regimes, unified Palestinian rejection of the "deal of the century" and normalization, and the resistance groups' victory in the Sword of Jerusalem battle will all contribute to the confusion in Arab politics, as regimes grapple with whether to proceed with normalization or postpone it.
In conclusion, the challenges and prospects for Palestinian reconciliation and institutional reorganization in the current context reflect both historical divisions and post-2023 Gaza War dynamics. These include prolonged political fragmentation between Hamas and Fatah-dominated PA, recovery from the wartime devastation, resolution of the role of Hamas and disarmament of factions, external pressures, potential displacement, and international mediation efforts to revive multi-phase truces linking hostage returns to reconstruction. Sustained diplomatic efforts and political compromise are essential to restore stability to the Palestinian domain.
- The Palestinian Strategic Report for 2022 raises concerns as it indicates a lack of optimism amidst the Palestinian crisis.
- Despite substantial improvements in the internal Palestinian scenario over the past two years, a significant letdown has occurred.
- The Palestinian Authority (PA) and Palestine Liberation Organisation (PLO) have faced an immense loss of faith and credibility among the Palestinian people.
- The report highlights the persistent crisis of the Palestinian national project and the ongoing strife among main Palestinian forces.
- The current leadership's mismanagement has led to the deterioration of official Palestinian institutions, offering no real solution for rebuilding the Palestinian domain.
- Without a stable leadership, there's a high probability of an interim Palestinian leadership or the appointment of a neutral party with uninterrupted powers to reorganize the Palestinian institutions.
- Palestinian factions, such as Hamas, Islamic Jihad, and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), might collaborate to form a Palestinian national front or alliance, advocating resistance and institution rebuilding.
- In the coming period, there's potential for increased popular action and initiatives, which may impact the Palestinian arena when tactfully managed.
- In contrast, Israel's internal political instability from 2019 to 2021 delayed decision-making, but the coalition government led by Naftali Bennett and Yair Lapid has managed to maintain unity.
- Israel continues to wrestle with the Palestinian resistance to its military occupation, despite economic and technological advancements, military superiority, high national income, and per capita income.
- The UAE and Bahrain entered agreements with Israel in 2020 and 2021, followed by Sudan and Morocco, leading to a substantial increase in trade between Israel and the UAE.
- However, the Arab world will likely remain unstable and disintegrate further, with widespread rejection of normalization persisting.
- Instability caused by the change of US president, decreased international pressure on Arab regimes, unified Palestinian rejection of the "deal of the century" and normalization, and resistance groups' success in the Sword of Jerusalem battle will complicate Arab politics.
- In conclusion, Palestinian reconciliation and organizational change must reckon with historical factions and the aftermath of the 2023 Gaza War.
- The challenges ahead encompass prolonged political divisions between Hamas and Fatah-controlled PA, wartime recovery, resolution of Hamas' role and factions' disarmament, external pressures, potential displacement, and international mediation to revive multiphase truces linking hostage releases to reconstruction.
- Sustained diplomatic efforts and political compromise are vital to restore stability to the Palestinian domain and achieve peace in the Middle East.
